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CASENOTE
See No Evil, Speak No Evil: Georgia
Supreme Court Narrows Requirements for
Mandatory Reporters in May v. State

I.

INTRODUCTION

Georgia's mandatory reporting statute' requires twenty-six professionals, including teachers, to report any suspected child abuse to proper
authorities. Even though the statute seemingly requires these professionals to report all child abuse, even if they have no professional
relationship with the child, no Georgia appellate court had ever
addressed the question of whether there must be a professional
relationship established for a duty to report abuse to develop. In May
v. State,2 a 2014 opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court clarified that
although it is unclear from the lack of case law how trial courts have
interpreted the statute, the correct interpretation only requires
professionals to report child abuse of children to whom they "attend" in
direct connection with their employment as listed in the mandatory
reporting statute.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Robert Morrow initiated an inappropriate and illegal sexual
relationship with a sixteen-year-old student at River Ridge High School.
The student, P.D.M., met Morrow in the ninth grade when he taught as
a paraprofessional in her class. The following year, during the student's
tenth grade year, Morrow began making sexual advances towards her.
Over the student's Christmas break, Morrow and P.D.M. met in parking
lots and cul-de-sacs at least three separate times to engage in sexual
conduct. Morrow initiated the first encounter by text messaging P.M.D.,

1.

O.C.GA. § 19-7-5 (2010 & 2014 Supp.).

2. 295 Ga. 388, 761 S.E.2d 38 (2014).

837

838

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

picking her up from a party, and driving her to a Publix parking lot
where they engaged in sexual conduct. One week later, the second
incident occurred when the two met at a fitness facility parking lot and
P.D.M. rubbed Morrow's penis. While the relationship was mostly
sexual, at one point, Morrow took P.D.M. shopping for clothes at
Perimeter Mall. However, afterwards Morrow drove them to a neighborhood cul-de-sac where their sexual relationship escalated to vaginal
intercourse.3
Each of the sexual encounters between Morrow and P.D.M. occurred
during the school's Christmas break, after which P.D.M. transferred to
a high school in another school district, Roswell High School.4 It is
unclear whether P.D.M. was still considered a student at River Ridge
during the Christmas break or if she had effectively transferred out of
the school at the end of classes in December 2010. 5 Regardless, in
January 2011, after the student began attending Roswell High, P.D.M.
attended a basketball game at River Ridge where she saw an old
teacher, Kristin May, and told her about her sexual relationship with
Morrow the previous school term. The next contact between May and
P.D.M. occurred in May 2011, when May emailed P.D.M. asking if she
and Morrow had continued their sexual relationship. At no point did
May report the relationship to school administrators or authorities.6
For unknown reasons, P.D.M. reported her relationship with Morrow
to the Woodstock Police Department on July 26, 2011, seven months
after the relationship began. Morrow later admitted having a sexual
relationship with P.D.M. and police subsequently arrested him, resulting
in an indictment in Cherokee County. May admitted to authorities that
P.D.M. confided in her about the sexual relationship with Morrow in
January 2011, and that she promised both P.D.M. and Morrow that she
would not tell anyone about the sexual relationship between the two.'
On August 10, 2011, Cherokee County authorities issued an arrest
warrant against May for "Failure to Report under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5." 8
May filed pleas in bar and a demurrer, both of which were denied by the
Superior Court in March 2013. May's application for interlocutory

3. Brief for Appellee, May v. State, 295 Ga. 388 (2014), 2013 WL 6696649, at *4-5.
4. Id. at *5.
5. Maureen Downey, Was former teacher mandated to report student-coach sexual
relationship?, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.ajc.com/weblogs/getschooled/2014/feb/03/does-states-mandatory-child-abuse-reporting-law-di/.

6. Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at *5-6. Both the state and local newspapers
suggest that May was motivated to keep Morrow's relations with P.D.M. secret because she
herself was having an extramarital affair with Morrow. Id. at *6.
7. Id. at *4, 7.
8. Id. at *3.
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review in the Georgia Court of Appeals was denied, and she subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Georgia Supreme Court
unanimously granted certiorari on October 7, 2013 and specifically
requested arguments regarding whether teachers are mandatory
reporters "in all circumstances.'
In its unanimous decision, the supreme court answered the question
by interpreting the statute's reporting requirements narrowly: school
teachers are only mandatory reporters to the extent they attend to the
alleged child abuse victim in connection with their employment by which
they are identified in the statute as a mandatory reporter. 10
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Before 1965: Why Mandatory Reporting Statutes Were Created
Prior to the enactment of its mandatory reporter statute, Georgia did
not legally require any citizen to report child abuse, and common law did
not place a duty to report child abuse on any person not currently
obligated to watch over children.11 The common law did, however,
require those persons accepting the responsibility of attending to, caring
1
for, or supervising a child to reasonably provide for the child's safety.
This mixture of duties was common among the states but was not
codified as law in the United States until the mid-1960s. 13
In 1962, a doctor published a revolutionary article entitled The
Battered Child Syndrome, 4 which recognized the existence of "child
5
abuse" as a medical condition for the first time in U.S. history. At the
same time, the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare developed and published a model statute for
state legislatures that suggested making it a requirement for all doctors
and health care employees to report any suspicion of child abuse and
stressed the need for subjecting those physicians who neglected to report
any suspicious abuse subject to criminal liability. 6 These simultaneous
A.

9. Id. at *3, 7-8.
10. May, 295 Ga. at 391, 398, 761 S.E.2d at 41, 45.
11. Macon, Dublin & Savannah R.R. Co. v. Jordan, 34 Ga. App. 350,353, 129 S.E. 443,
444 (1925).
12. See Doe v. Andujar, 297 Ga. App. 696, 697-98, 678 S.E.2d 163, 165 (2009); see also
Persinger v. Step by Step Infant Dev. Ctr., 253 Ga. App. 768, 769, 560 S.E.2d 333, 335-36
(2002).
13. See, e.g., Ga. H.B. 44, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588.
14. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-ChildSyndrome, 181 JAMA 17 (1962).
15. Id. at 17.
16. Caroline T. Trost, Chilling Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA
Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 192 (1998); see also Margaret H. Meriwether, Child
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publications sparked immense public interest in the welfare and
protection of children, specifically the states' duties to provide for such
interests.'7 As a result, state governments quickly began enacting
mandatory reporting laws.' By 1967, every state enacted some form
of mandatory reporting statute.19
B. Georgia's Version: From Ga. Code Ann. § 74-111 to O.C.G.A. § 197-5
After this growing demand for increased protection for children, the
Georgia General Assembly enacted Georgia's first mandatory reporting
statute in 1965.20 The statute was very similar to other states' new
mandatory reporting statutes because it only identified categories of
professionals to be mandatory reporters that were related to the health
care profession.
Specifically, Georgia's statute required physicians,
doctors of medicine, licensed osteopathic physicians, intern residents,
public health nurses, and public welfare workers to report child
abuse.22 The law required these professionals to report suspected abuse
of children under the age of twelve to police authorities or any child
Abuse ReportingLaws: Time for a Change, 20 FAM. L.Q. 141, 142 (1986).
17. See Meriwether, supra note 16, at 142.
18. Trost, supra note 16, at 192.
19. Meriwether, supra note 16, at 142.
20. Ga. H.B. 44, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 197-5).
21. Id. at 588-89.
22. Id. at 588. The exact text of the original provision read as follows:
(a) Reports by Physicians, other treating personnel, and Institutions. Any
physician, including any doctor of medicine licensed to practice under Chapter 849 of the Code of Georgia of 1933, as amended, licensed osteopathic physician,
intern, resident, public health nurse or welfare worker having cause to believe
that a child under the age of twelve brought to him or coming before him for
examination, care or treatment has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon
him other than by accidental means by a parent or caretaker, shall report or cause
reports to be made in accordance with the provisions of this Section; provided,
however, that when the attendance of a physician with respect to a child is
pursuant to the performance of services as a member of the staff of a hospital or
similar institution he shall notify the person in charge of the institution or his
designated delegate who shall report or cause reports to be made in accordance
with the provisions of this section; and provided, further, that when an apparently
abused child has been seen by a public health nurse or welfare worker, then said
public health nurse or welfare worker shall report his or her observation to the
county health officer or, if none, to any licensed physician who shall, after
examination and if he concurs that the injuries were inflicted by other than
accidental means, report or cause reports to be made in accordance with the
provisions of this section.
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welfare agency.2 1 Civil and criminal immunity were granted to those

mandatory reporters that reported suspected child abuse under this
statute "in good faith."2' The statute's purpose remains generally
untouched since its enactment in 1965: to ensure the protection of
children by the state and its agencies after the abuse is brought to their
attention. 25 The statute was, and still is, to be "liberally construed" in
order to conform to the statute's broad purpose.26
Since its enactment in 1965, the legislature has substantially revised
the mandatory reporter statute over sixteen times in order to expand the
categories of reporters, change the type of immunity granted to those
reporters, change the process for making such reports, and add a
permissive reporter category.27 The statute was first amended three
years after its enactment by adding dentists and podiatrists to the list
Up to this point, the legislature only included
of professionals.'
that were members of the health care profeslist
the
in
professionals
29
sion. In 1973, the legislature expanded the statute to include, for the
first time, professionals who were not in the health industry, including
school system employees, and county and city employees.3" Further,
the statute now required that any other professional that is "charged
with the responsibility for the health, welfare or education of a child"

23. Id. at 589.
24. Id.
25. Compare id. at 589-90 with O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5.
26. Ga. H.B. 588, Reg. Sees., 1965 Ga. Laws 590.
27. See Ga. H.B. 588, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588; Ga. S.B. 210, Reg. Sess., 1968 Ga.
Laws 1196; Ga. H.B. 375, Reg. Seas., 1973 Ga. Laws 309; Ga. S.B. 176, Reg. Seas., 1974 Ga.
Laws 438; Ga. H.B. 48, Reg. Seas., 1977 Ga. Laws 242; Ga. S.B. 616, Reg. Seas., 1978 Ga.
Laws 2059; Ga. H.B. 1676, Reg. Seas., 1980 Ga. Laws 921; Ga. H.B. 143, Reg. Sess., 1981
Ga. Laws 1034; Ga. H.B. 1355, Reg. Seass., 1988 Ga. Laws 1624; Ga. H.B. 1316, Reg. Sess.,
1990 Ga. Laws 1761; Ga. S.B. 1, Reg. Seass., 1993 Ga. Laws 1695; Ga. H.B. 1208, Reg. Seas.,
1994 Ga. Laws 97; Ga. H.B. 261, Reg. Seas., 1999 Ga. Laws 81; Ga. S.B. 442, Reg. Sess.,
2006 Ga. Laws 485; Ga. S.B. 69, Reg. Seas., 2009 Ga. Laws 733; Ga. H.B. 1176, Reg. Seas.,
2012 Ga. Laws 899; Ga. H.B. 79, Reg. Seass., 2013 Ga. Laws 141; Ga. H.B. 242, Reg. Sess.,
2013 Ga. Laws 294; Ga. H.B. 78, Reg. Seass., 2013 Ga. Laws 524.
28. Ga. S.B. 210, Reg. Seas., 1968 Ga. Laws 1196-97 (codified as amended at O.C.G.
§ 19-7-5). Even though the list of reporters are "mandatory" under the statutory language,
interestingly, the purpose of the senate bill explains that the statute is amended "to
include dentists and podiatrists among those parties permitted to report cases of cruel
treatment of children with immunity from civil or criminal liability." Id. at 1196. This
interpretation is consistent with the statutory language because, at that time, the
mandatory reporters were given full civil and criminal immunity for good faith efforts to
conform to the statutory requirements. See id.
29. See id.
30. Ga. H.B. 375, Reg. Seas., 1973 Ga. Laws 309.
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must also report child abuse.3 The age range of children covered
under the statute was changed from twelve-years-old to eighteen-yearsold.32 This expansion was implemented based on the rationale that these
particular professionals are most likely to be in regular contact with atrisk children and will be more likely to notice the more subtle changes
that occur in children who are being abused.33
The 1970s brought a new wave of statutory reform in Georgia. These
changes were specifically influenced by Congress's creation of the federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA). 4 This
federal statute guided the state legislatures to promote "three national
goals for child protection:" (1) safety of children, (2) permanency of those
children in stable homes, and (3) child and family well-being.35 In
relevant part, CAPTA explained that federal funding would be granted
to state child welfare agencies only if the states would, among other
requirements, include a provision for criminal and civil immunity in
their mandatory reporting statutes and also explain the statute's
purpose in the overall child welfare scheme.36
In 1974, the legislature completely revised and re-categorized
Georgia's mandatory reporting statute to specifically include school
teachers, school administrators, child-care personnel, and law enforcement to the list of mandatory reporters of child abuse.37 Because the
list of mandatory reporters was expanded so broadly, the statutory
phrase requiring children to be brought to the professionals for
"examination, care or treatment" was removed entirely.3" However, the
statutory scheme remained the same-the professional attendance of the
child must be present before the professional's responsibility to report

31. Id. at 310. This new category was a start in the direction of encompassing a larger
variety of reporter professions, but it was not clear whether it included all teachers in
public elementary, middle, and high schools, or just the paid administrators and faculty
of those schools.
32. Id.
33. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and
Society's Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. RaV. 819, 851-52 (2010).
34. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat.
4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994)); Trost, supra note 16, at 192-93.
35. Cynthia Crosson-Tower, The Role of Educators in Preventing and Responding to
Child Abuse and Neglect, HHS,7 (2003), www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/educator.pdf.
36. Trost, supra note 16, at 192-94; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106.
37. Ga. S.B. 176, Reg. Sess., 1974 Ga. Laws 439 (codified as amended O.C.G.A. § 19-75).
38. Ga. H.B. 588, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588 (codified as amended O.C.G. § 19-7-
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9
Likewise, the method for
suspected child abuse was triggered.
making these reports did not change, which suggests that the legislature
did not intend on changing the reporting requirement to report any child
abuse, even if the alleged victim did not come to him in the context of
his profession.' Rather, the language continued to require that when
the child came before the professional as a direct result of their
occupation in a hospital or school, the professional is required to report
to his supervisor or a designated go-to delegate within their
the abuse
41
staff.
Even before teachers were mandated by the statute to report child
abuse, statistics show that almost thirty percent of the professionals that
reported child abuse to Child Protective Services (CPS) and other
42
This easily demonstrates why the legislaauthorities were teachers.
to the mandatory reporter list in
professionals
tures chose to add these
The
child abuse anyways. 43
reporting
1990-they were already
because
lives
children's
in
play
educators
role
statistics show the vital
they were already involved in responding to the national child abuse
emergency.44 Educators play an important role in reporting child abuse
because young children and adolescents spend a large part of their lives
in school with their teachers, giving these educators much greater
contact with the children than any of the other mandated professionals.4" As a result, teachers have very close contact with the children
who are at risk of being abused and have the ability to recognize
changing behaviors, moods, and physical4 appearances of those children
in a way that other professionals do not.
Some states grant civil and criminal immunity for all mandatory
reporters, while others do not grant any immunity at all. In 1977, the
Georgia legislature repealed the criminal immunity once granted to
mandatory reporters in previous versions and declared that willful
47
failure to report child abuse is a misdemeanor under Georgia law.

39.

Ga. S.B. 176, Reg. Sess., 1974 Ga. Laws. 439 (codified as amended O.C.G-A. § 19-7-

5).
40. See id.
41. Id. The court in May placed great emphasis on the inclusion of this language in
the statute: the duty was created to be limited to children seen within the person's
professional capacity. 295 Ga. at 398, 761 S.E.2d at 45.
42. Crosson-Tower, supra note 35, at 9.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 8-9.
46. Id. at 9, 10.
47. Ga. H.B. 48, Reg. Sess., 1977 Ga. Laws 242 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 197-5).
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The state wanted to maximize the number of child abuse reports made
to combat the continuing national child-welfare scheme, so it created a
new category of reporters."
Now, any citizen regardless of their
profession can report suspected child abuse to any delegated personnel
provided in the statute.49
Notwithstanding the valiant efforts of the legislature to combat child
abuse, it is difficult to pinpoint the effectiveness of the imposition of
criminal liability because the number of arrests under the statute are
not reported-most crime-reporting statistics only indicate the number
of major felony arrests and convictions each year.5" Further, although
civil immunity is still granted to mandatory reporters in the statute,
civil claims are litigated more often than criminal liability.5 1 Plaintiffs
regularly ask courts to impose civil liability on mandatory reporters who
either fail to report or make a report that is unsubstantiated.5 2
However, courts agree civil immunity will remain as long as the reporter
acted in good faith, had a reasonable suspicion of abuse, and caused
reports to be made pursuant to the code section.5 3 Courts often
interpret the "knowingly and willingly" provision-in determining
whether to impose civil liability-by giving it a normal meaning for both
the criminal and civil aspect: if the reporter had a reasonable suspicion,
but acted in bad faith by intentionally failing to report, both civil and
criminal liability can be imposed.5' Because the majority of litigation
regarding the mandatory reporting statute revolves around civil rather
than criminal liability, and because failure to report child abuse is not
a crime that typically gets statistically reported, it is impossible to know

48.

Id. at 243.

49. Id. This change evidences an important inference: the legislature could have
imposed a general duty for all adult residents to report child abuse, but instead it only
imposed a duty on those citizens whose professions allow them to regularly interact with
at-risk children.
50. See GeorgiaFamily Violence Statistics(2012), GEORGIA BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS,
services.georgia.gov/gbi/crimestats/displayFamilyViolenceStatForm.do;
see also 2012
Summary Report: Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) System, GEORGIA CRIME INFORMATION
CENTER (2012), available at https://gbi.georgia.gov/sites/gbi.georgia.gov/files/related_files/
sitepage/2012%2OCrime%2OStatistics%2OSummary%2OReport.pdf; 2013 Summary Report
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) System, GEORGIA CRIME INFORMATION CENTER (2013),
available at https://gbi.georgia.gov/sites/gbi.georgia.gov/files/related files/site.page/2013
%20Crimes%20Statistics%20Summary%20Report.pdf.
51. See, e.g., O'Heron v. Blaney, 276 Ga. 871, 583 S.E.2d 834 (2003); Vance v. T.R.C.
229 Ga. App. 608, 494 S.E.2d 714 (1997); Cechman v. Travis, 202 Ga. App. 255, 414 S.E.2d
282 (1991).
52. See, e.g., O'Heron, 276 Ga. at 872, 583 S.E.2d at 835.
53. See, e.g., id. at 873, 583 S.E.2d at 336.
54. See id.
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whether the imposition of criminal liability actually encourages more
55
mandatory reporters to report child abuse.
The nation-wide enactment of mandatory reporting statutes did little
to combat the growing concern for the welfare and safety of abused
children. 6 As a result, mandatory reporter statutes, including Georgia's,
have been subjected to national criticism. In 1990, the U.S. Advisory
Board on Child Abuse and Neglect proclaimed that the United States
was in the midst of a "national emergency" based on the child abuse and
child neglect prevalent at that time.57 Critics emphasize the ineffectiveness of these statutory schemes by comparing past and present
statistics that show little change in child welfare as a result of these
reporting requirements."
As a result of this growing criticism of national reporting statutes, the
Georgia legislature increased the list of professionals from six to twentya new array of definitions, such as "child abuse" and
nine,5 9 added
"school,' 6° and expanded methods for making reports to include the
larger variety of professions. 1 "Child abuse" now encompasses nonaccidental physical harm, neglect, exploitation, sexual abuse, and sexual
exploitation. 2 "School" has been clarified to include both public and
private schools ranging from pre-kindergarten programs to any
postsecondary school. 3
To compensate for this vast new array of reporters and requirements,
the statute was substantially re-written in 1990 to separate the
professionals, the methods for reporting, the definitions, and the purpose
into distinct subsections for clarity and precision." This new structure
is included in the present-day version,6 5 but courts did not interpret the
statutory language until 2014.66 As such, until the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision in May, no Georgia court confronted the issue of

55. See supra notes 49, 52, and accompanying text.
56. U.S. Advisory Board on Children Abuse and Neglect, Child Abuse and Neglect:

CriticalFirst Steps in Response to a National Emergency, U.S. GPO, 2 (Aug. 1990).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(c) (2014 Supp.).
60. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(b) (2014 Supp.).
61. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(d)-(i) (2014 Supp.). Notably, the civil liability, criminal liability,
and purpose have remained the same. Id.
62. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(bX4).
63. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(bX9).
64. Ga. H.B. 1316, Reg. Sess., 1990 Ga. Laws 1761 (codified as amended O.C.G.A. § 19-

7-5).

65.
66.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5 (2010 & 2014 Supp.).
See generally May, 295 Ga. 388, 761 S.E.2d 38.
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whether mandatory reporters should report all suspected child abuse or
just their suspicions regarding the children to whom they attend. 7
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In June of 2014, the Georgia Supreme Court granted Kristin May's
petition for writ of certiorari to determine whether Georgia's mandatory
reporter statute obligates the listed professionals to report suspected
abuse of any child or just the suspected abuse of those children to whom
they attend in connection with their profession. 8 In a unanimous
decision, Justice Blackwell explained that the obligation to report only
arises because of the professional's attendance of the allegedly-abused
children, imposing a narrow interpretation of the statute.69
The court initially explained that the trial court's interpretation was
flawed because it only looked at the statutory provision without
considering the legislative history, the context of the provision, and its
relationship to other language found in other provisions of the statute. ' If read in isolation, the language in subsection (cXl) seems clear:
if you are a member of a listed profession, you are required to report any
suspicion of child abuse to authorities.7" But, according to the court,
if the legislature wanted the statute to be interpreted as such, it likely
would not have omitted the subsequent paragraph72 that describes the
alternative reporting method that listed professionals working within a
facility, such as a school, hospital, or similarly situated agency, should
use.73 The court held that the key language in this particular subsection is,
If a person is requiredto report child abuse pursuantto this subsection
because that person attends to a child pursuantto such person's duties

67. See id. In fact, May is one of the first cases in Georgia where a mandatory reporter
has appealed their arrest, indictment, or conviction under this statute. As such, this was

the first time a Georgia appellate court has had the opportunity to interpret the statutory
language.
68. Id. at 390-91, 761 S.E.2d at 40.

69. Id. at 391, 761 S.E.2d at 41.
70. Id. The correct method of interpretation, according to the court, begins by looking
at the context of the provision requiring certain professionals to report reasonable
suspicions of child abuse. Id.; see also Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 573-74, 731 S.E.2d 731,
736 (2012) (explaining that it is imperative to consider statutory provisions in relation to
their context, both within the statute and legally).

71. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(cXl).
72. May, 295 Ga. at 392, 761 S.E.2d at 41-42. The court places great emphasis on the
first sentence of this paragraph because it illuminates the purpose of the legislature in
requiring these particular professionals to be mandatory reporters. Id.
73. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(cX2).
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as an employee of or volunteer [at one of these agencies], that person
rather
shall notify the... designated delegate [within that agency,
74
agency].
than directly report the abuse to a child welfare
Since legislatures strategically and carefully include every word and
phrase in a statute, the court determined that this language lends itself
to only one meaning: the legal obligation to report arises only when
attending to the child and suspecting abuse of that child, rather than the
75
mere fact that your profession is listed on the statute.
This reading led the court to answer the obvious follow up question:
7
why require some professionals to directly report abuse to a child-welfare
the institution instead?
agency but require others to report within
The court justified this by observing that schools, hospitals, and larger
agencies already have internal protocol in place that will encourage
reporting, prevent duplicate reports, and ensure delivery of reports to
Since case law concerning this particular
the proper authorities .
court placed much of its emphasis on the
the
issue is sparse in Georgia,
to determine the legislative intent and
statute
legal background of the
7
In
these particular professionals.
including
overall purpose for
read
be
to
statute
the
intended
legislature
determining whether the
narrowly, the court found insight in the original version of the statute.79 The original stipulation in 1965 explicitly noted that a professional's duty to report arose when the child was "brought to him or c[amel
°
before him for examination, care or treatment." Although the statute
changed significantly over the next several years to remove that
particular phrase, the provision was altered only to encompass the new
expansive list of professionals required to report, not to remove the legal
8
effect of its meaning. ' The legislature intended the statute to only
require the duty to arise if the child comes to the professional while they
82
are acting in their professional capacity.
After concluding that a relationship between the professional and child
must be established through the attendance of the child, the court

74. May, 295 Ga. at 392, 761 S.E.2d at 41 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5(c)(2)).
75. Id. at 391, 761 S.E.2d at 41.
76. See id. at 393, 761 S.E.2d at 42.
77. Id. at 393-94, 761 S.E.2d at 42-43.
78. Id. at 394-98, 761 S.E.2d at 43-45.
79. Ga. H.B. 588, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 197-5).
80. Id.
81. See Ga. S.B. 210, Reg. Sess., 1968 Ga. Laws 1197; Ga. H.B. 375, Reg. Sess., 1973
Ga. Laws 309; Ga. S.B. 146, Reg. Sess., 1974 Ga. Laws 438; Ga. H.B. 48, Reg. Sess., 1977
Ga. Laws 244.
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
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vaguely addressed the type of factual scenario that could evidence this
relationship by explaining the factual scenario that does not establish
such a relationship. 3 In the case at bar, without reference to other
factors that could help future courts wrestle with this issue, the court
noted that May had been the abused-child's teacher prior to learning of
the abuse and that the student confided in May about the abuse when
she was no longer a student at the school or in the same school district
as May.8' The court ends its application there, holding that these facts
alone do not reasonably establish the requisite relationship required to
impose a duty to report child abuse under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5."5 The
court does not consider whether P.D.M. was May's student at the time
of the confirmed abuse or if any alteration of the facts would result in a
different conclusion.' The court alludes to issues that could arise if,
for example, the student remains at the same school but is no longer the
teacher's student, but the court does not allude to any possible answers
to these troublesome scenarios. 7 Regardless of its implications, the
court held that since May did not "attend" to P.D.M. at the time she
learned of the abuse, she did not have a duty to report the abuse to
authorities.'
As a result of this holding, Georgia's mandatory reporting statute
must be interpreted narrowly to mean that professionals are only
required to report suspicions of child abuse they learn through attending
to the alleged victim. However, the majority of interpretive questions
remain unanswered.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

A.

Legislative and JudicialChanges in Interpretation
While this was not declared a case of first impression, the court
clarified a murky statutory issue by deciding the exact interpretation
that courts must use when applying Georgia's mandatory reporting
83. See May, 295 Ga. at 399, 761 S.E.2d at 45-46.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 399, 761 S.E.2d at 46.

86. See id.
87. Id. at 399 n.12, 761 S.E.2d at 46 n.12. There are a myriad of alterations to this
scenario that could lead to difficult interpretive questions to which this decision lends no
guidance. Is it relevant that the abuse could have occurred while May was P.D.M.'s
teacher, even though the abuse was not discovered until afterwards? In the legal context,
does the "attending" of the child need to occur at the time of the abuse? At the time of the
allegation? Or simply at any point in the past? What ifP.D.M. had transferred to a school
within the same school district?
88. Id. at 399, 761 S.E.2d at 45-46.
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statute: teachers do not have to report child abuse of children if they do
9
not attend to those children in connection with their profession. This
clarification, however, did nothing to help courts interpret the requirement that professionals must "attend to" the child for their duty to arise.
The issue will not likely arise in the medical context because it is
usually evident when a doctor or dentist attends to the child if the child
was brought to him by his guardian for the purpose of being medically
treated.9" The distinction is much more blurred in the educational
context because teachers and school employees interact with hundreds
of students each day. The court did not clarify whether the employee
must actually be teaching the student when the abuse is discovered, or
whether a student on the same hallway or in the same school system is
sufficiently under their control and the duty arises the moment they
arrive at the school building.9 1 The bottom line is that after this
decision, pertinent professionals need to know exactly what "attend to"
means. Whether it comes from further judicial interpretation or
immediate legislative intervention, professionals need clarification.
Since this statute has changed in some capacity every few years since
its enactment,9 2 this restriction on its interpretation will likely cause
an amendment to be made to elucidate the statute's application and
scope."3 The statute's declared purpose has not significantly changed
over the years, so the Georgia General Assembly will likely agree with
the court's decision and re-write the provisions to clarify the relationship
between the statute's purpose and the statute's narrow application. If
the legislature agrees with the holding that professionals listed within
the statute need not report all cases of child abuse they suspect, this
documented clarification may require adding a significant amount of
professionals to the list to compensate for decreased reporting to prevent
children from falling through the cracks.9 4
89. Id. at 391, 761 S.E.2d at 41.
90. See Ga. H.B. 588, Reg. Sess., 1965 Ga. Laws 588 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.

§ 19-7-5).
91. See May, 295 Ga. at 389 n.12, 761 S.E.2d at 45-46 n.12.
92. See, e.g., Ga. S.B. 210, Reg. Sess., 1968 Ga. Laws 1196-97; Ga. H.B. 375, Reg. Sess.,
1973 Ga. Laws 309; Ga. H.B. 48, Reg. Sess., 1977 Ga. Laws 244; Ga. H.B. 1316, Reg. Sess.,
1990 Ga. Laws 1761.
93. See generally Maia Szalavitz, Viewpoint: Why a Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting
Law Could Backfire, TIME (Dec. 14, 2011), http-//healthland.time.com/20111214/view
point-why-a-mandatory-child-abuse-reporting-law-could-backfiret. It is natural for people
and legislatures to react to reoccurring issues simply to "do something," but it is imperative
that these actions at least be a step in the right direction. Id.
94. The currently listed professionals are only a handful of the professionals that come
into extensive contact with children. Why are lifeguards, recreation-league coaches, private
tutors, Boy Scout and Girl Scout leaders, and baby-sitters not mandatory reporters?
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This legislative clarification will likely include additional definitions
within the statute to explain exactly what "attend to" means, or it may
revert to previous statutory language that requires the child to come
before the professional to care for them.95 Other states that construe
their statute similarly to the Court in May include such definitions.9 6
For example, Washington requires that any professional who "regularly
exercises supervisory authority" over a child to report suspected child
abuse.97 Within the same statute, the legislature added a paragraph
that explains "supervisory authority" occurs when the professional is in
a position of authority over the child and acts within a "supervisory
capacity on an ongoing or continuing basis."' This clarification makes
it easy for Washington courts to interpret and apply this standard
regularly and consistently because it requires a duty to report only in
the "actual regular course of employment."9
Since there is no applicable case law regarding the interpretation of
this statute, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly how the trial courts have
interpreted the statute up until this novel ruling in May. Without
legislative clarification of this nature, Georgia courts could either further
narrow the requirement by declaring that teachers only attend to
children to whom they directly teach throughout the day, or they could
interpret the holding to find a broad definition requiring teachers to
report abuse of any child they come into contact with in their school
system.

Perhaps these types of professionals wiln be named in future versions of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-5.

95. See Ga. S.B. 210, Reg. Sess., 1968 Ga. Laws 1196-97; Ga. H.B. 375, Reg. Sess., 1973
Ga. Laws 309; Ga. H.B. 48, Reg. Sess., 1977 Ga. Laws 244; Ga. H.B. 1316, Reg. Sess., 1990
Ga. Laws 1761.
96. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(1)(b) (2014 Supp.).

97. Id.
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(lXbXii).

99. Jane Doe v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 167
F.3d 1193, 1204 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). This case deals with the specific issue posed to the
court in May. The civil plaintiff argued that the state's mandatory reporting statute should
be interpreted broadly to include anyone employed in one of the professions listed. Id. at

1202. The Washington court disagreed. Id. at 1197. Even though the legislature intended
the statute to be interpreted broadly, the plaintiffs interpretation would broaden the
requirements further than the legislature actually intended. Id. at 1203. The court relied
on the language in the statute that only requires these professionals to report if they are
acting within their professional capacity or "in the course of regular employment." Id. at

1204. This interpretation follows the interpretation in May: professionals listed are not
mandated to report all suspected abuse, only when they suspect abuse throughout the
course of their profession. Id.; May, 295 Ga. at 391, 761 S.E.2d at 41.
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B. Renewed State and Nation-wide Attention on Child-Abuse Crisis
It only took one medical essay in the 1960s and one federal statute in
the 1970s to spark nation-wide interest and concern for child-abuse
issues, so it is possible that this holding, in conjunction with future
legislative and judicial interpretations, could renew the nation's interest
in the child-abuse crisis and mandatory reporting scheme.' ° Ever
since the enactment of the state mandatory reporting statutes, critics
have complained of their ineffectiveness because the majority of reports
made by mandatory reporters are never substantiated. 01' Other
reporters argue that these statutes have turned the mandatory reporters
"into a white-collar police force," even though these reporters are not
actually discovering child abuse. 102 Many of these critics urge that
this police force, made up of professionals dodging civil and criminal
liability, should be eliminated because the protective service agencies
rely too heavily on these reports that are never substantiated.0 3
Reports of suspected child abuse are central to child-welfare agencies
across the state, such as the Department of Family and Children
Services (DFCS) and Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASA)." 4
The entire child-welfare agency focuses on taking incoming reports and
investigating those reports to determine their substance." 5 In 2014,
Georgia's DFCS has already investigated 33,221 reports of child
abuse. 106 If teachers and other mandatory reporters significantly
decrease the amount of reports made each year, the number of investiga-

100.
Pub. L.
101.
102.

103.

Kempe, supra note 14, at 17; Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974,
No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106).
See Hafemeister, supra note 33, at 900.
Id. at 900-01.

Id.

104. See, e.g., About Us, CASA, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.
5301303/k.6FB1/AboutUs__CASA forChildren.htm. (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); Child
Abuse & Neglect, DHS, https-/dfcs.dhs.georgia.gov/child-abuse-neglect (last visited Mar.
7, 2015).
105. Gary B. Melton, Mandated Reporting: A Policy Without Reason, 29 CHILD ABUSE

& NEGLECT 9, 13, 15 (2005). "[Mlandated reporting at times increases distrust among
neighbors ... [and] contribute[s] to increased isolation and interfere [nce] with norms." Id.
at 15. In fact, the focus placed upon this reporting process has said to be "[tihe most
serious shortcoming of the nation's system of intervention on behalf of children." Id. at 13.
Placing such great emphasis on this scheme focuses on punitively threatening the reporters
instead of placing emphasis on encouraging substantial reports from anyone in the
community. Id. at 12, 13.
106. Division of Family and Children Services, HHS, httpJ/dhs.georgia.gov/sites/dhs.
georgia.gov/files/DFCS%20FACTS%20SHEET%208.14%20-%2ORevised%2C%208-2514%20.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
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tions opened each year could significantly decrease. This would have
incredible influence across the entire juvenile justice system. 7 because
there will be fewer dependency' 8 and Child In Need of Services
(CHINS) 9 cases in the courts."0 Without this investigative and
rehabilitation process for abused children and their abusers, more
children would remain in their abuser's care."'
The policy within these organizations may have to change to
compensate for a decrease in reports, and perhaps more investigations
will have to be initiated internally rather than externally. Without
these reports, organizations will rely on the permissive reporter
provision in the statute to fill the void in reports. In contrast, if this

107. See Melton, supra note 105, at 12, 14.
108. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-150 (2014). This statute resonates the purpose of the mandatory
reporter statute in that any person who suspects child abuse can make a petition alleging
dependency of that child. Id. Dependency is defined as a child who "(A) Has been abused
or neglected and is in need of the protection of the court; (B) Has been placed for care or
adoption in violation of law; or (C) Is without his or her parent, guardian, or legal
custodian." O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(22) (2014).
109. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-390 (2014). A child is in need of services if he meets any of the
following requirements:
(A) A child adjudicated to be in need of care, guidance, counseling, structure,
supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation and who is adjudicated to be:
(i) Subject to compulsory school attendance and who is habitually and without
good and sufficient cause truant, as such term is defined in Code Section 15-11381, from school;
(ii) Habitually disobedient of the reasonable and lawful commands of his or her
parent, guardian, or legal custodian and is ungovernable or places himself or
herself or others in unsafe circumstances;
(iii) A runaway, as such term is defined in Code Section 15-11-381;
(iv) A child who has committed an offense applicable only to a child;
(v) A child who wanders or loiters about the streets of any city or in or about
any highway or any public place between the hours of 12:00 Midnight and 5:00
A.M.;
(vi) A child who disobeys the terms of supervision contained in a court order
which has been directed to such child who has been adjudicated a child in need
of services; or
(vii) A child who patronizes any bar where alcoholic beverages are being sold,
unaccompanied by his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, or who
possesses alcoholic beverages; or
(B) A child who has committed a delinquent act and is adjudicated to be in need
of supervision but not in need of treatment or rehabilitation.
O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(11) (2014).
110. Melton, supra note 105, at 13, 14. The entire juvenile justice system is dependent
on the reports made to Child Protective Services and other similar agencies. Id. Some
critics claim that this over-dependency is the reason that child abuse is still prevalent in
our nation today. Id.
111. Id. at 15.

20151

MAY V. STATE

853

holding encourages professionals to over-report because of the threat of
criminal liability, there will be an influx of cases swamping DFCS and
CASA workers who are already tremendously over-worked and understaffed." 2 This influx would cause an increased involvement of law
enforcement with these agencies and within the lives of the alleged
abuse victims' families. But, even if these agencies could compensate,
would it remedy the problem?" 3
Since declaring a "national emergency" of child abuse over two decades
ago,"' the emergency has not dissolved-child abuse is just as prevalent today as it was when the crisis began." 5 If the system put in
place by the legislature is not working to effectuate the issue of child
abuse and neglect in Georgia, and the Georgia Supreme Court upholds
the system and even further limits it, what happens to the victims? In
2012, 129,427 reports were made to Georgia's Child Protective Services." 6 Out of those, only 19,462 reports were substantiated actual child
abuse." 7 If it took almost 130,000 reports to uncover only 20,000 cases
of actual child abuse, what will happen if the number of initial reports
significantly decreases? Failing to report or decreasing the overall
number of reports can cause serious consequences "to the child, the
family, and ultimately to society" by causing those children to "suffer
unnecessarily" at the hands of those entrusted for their safety and wellbeing."' In the alternative, over-reporting can subject families and
children to lengthy investigations, numerous court appearances, forced
and invasive agency involvement in their private
examinations,
119
affairs.
A broader interpretation used by courts prior to this decision could
have caused the dramatic reporting of unsubstantiated claims. If this
is true, the May holding could reduce the amount of unsubstantiated
reports made and increase--or remain consistent-the amount of

112. See U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 56, at 34.
113. Melton, supra note 105, at 12-13.
114.
115.
116.

See U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 56, at 2.
Melton, supra note 105, at 13.
Child Maltreatment 2012, HHS (2013), www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/ffiles/cb/cm

2012.pdf.
117. Id. Another report from 2001 suggests that only twenty-eight percent of the
reports made by mandatory reports were substantiated by findings of actual child abuse.
Jessica Ann Toth Johns, Mandated Voices for the Vulnerable: An Examination of the
Constitutionalityof Missouri'sMandatoryChildAbuseReportingStatute, 72 UMKC L. REV.

1083, 1088 (2004).
118.

JANET MASON, CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO REPORT 53, 54 (2d ed. 2003).

119.

Meriwether, supra note 16, at 150.
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substantiated, serious reports.1 2 ° For better or worse, the May holding
significantly limits the protection for children in Georgia who are subject
to child abuse. The most frightful implication of all, however, is that we
will likely never know the actual implication of this decision on the
children because abused children are less likely to ever be discovered.'
EMILY L. EvETT

120. Id. at 150-51.
121.

See id.

